Certainties and the Bedrock of Moral Reasoning: Three Ways the Spade Turns.

In this paper, we identify and explain three kinds of bedrock in moral thought. The term "bedrock," as introduced by Wittgenstein in 217 of the Philosophical Investigations, stands for the end of a chain of reasoning. We affirm that some chains of moral reasoning do indeed end with certainty. However, different kinds of certainties in morality work in different ways. In the course of systematizing the different types of certainties, we argue that present accounts of certainties in morality do not reflect their diversity. Our analysis yields three types of moral certainty: quasi-undoubtable certain propositions, certain propositions, and transcendental certainties. We show that the first two types can, at least to some extent, be intelligibly doubted. Therefore, they do not possess the characteristics that would classify them as bedrock in the strictest sense. Transcendental certainties cannot likewise be doubted because they are rules that enable moral thinking. Thus, deviating from them is unintelligible. We shall argue that all three types reflect ways in which moral language games come to an end, while only one, transcendental certainties, displays the characteristic of being solid bedrock.

Universität Wien
Veterinärmedizinische Universität Wien